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Abstract 
This paper extends discussions on the role of emotion in scientific lives, by showing how the 
emotional commitments of researchers (here, psychologists and neuroscientists) can play a 
specifically constitutive or generative role. Autism research is an area where the tricky 
intertwinements of subjects, thoughts, interactions and bodies can be remarkably explicit: the 
paper uses this case to show how researchers' emotions can actually mediate transactions between 
intellectual/scientific problems and more material/bodily concerns. The paper argues that autism 
research shows the on-going presence of affect in scientific subjectivities; in particular, it shows 
how scientific subjects sometimes constitute intellectual projects through a sensitivity to their own 
bodies and emotions.  Gathering these concerns together, the paper extends recent discussions of 
body-work and emotion-work by Natasha Myers and Elizabeth Wilson, and also draws on the 
µHPRWLRQDO¶DVSHFWVRI$1:KLWHKHDG¶VSURFHVVSKLORVRSK\ 
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Introduction 
This paper is about the relationship between autism research, emotion, and feeling. In particular, it 
is about the way that neuroscientists who work on autism often talk about their research through 
notably emotional narratives, and about the way that they sometimes articulate their science 
through the bodies and feelings with which those emotions are registered. In the clinical literature, 
µDutism spectrum GLVRUGHUV¶describes a group of neurodevelopmental conditions with 
characteristic problems across three domains: social interaction, communication and repetitive 
behaviour or interests (WHO, 2010). Autism has increased in both prominence and visibility in 
recent decades, and an increase in UK prevalence to 1% (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009), has made 
autism the focus of a growing popular and political concern (Murray, 2008). And yet, despite this 
emergence, autism has not yet been fixed to any firm genetic or neurological marker (Lord et al., 
2011; Gupta and State, 2007) ± a gap that makes autism a topic of growing interest to social 
scientists and humanists too (Grinker, 2007; Eyal et al. 2010; Davidson, 2008).  
This paper emerges from a research project in which, as a sociologist of neuroscience, I have 
been trying to think about the ways that autism gets figured by the theories, methods and 
institutions of the new brain sciences. One aim of this project has been to characterise the 
conceptual and affective labour of neuroscience, especially as that practice is caught up with the 
description of new diagnostic forms, such as autism. Pursuing this interest, I have conduced short 
narrative interviews with thirty-four cognitive-psychological and biological-psychiatric autism 
researchers, almost all involved in brain-imaging studies of auitsm ± to get a sense of how these 
researchers think about, and conceptually work towards, the connections between autism and the 
brain. As a novice interviewer, though, I struggled to find an entry-point for this ± and so, as an 
ice-breaker, I started to ask interviewees about what had gotten them interested in autism research 
in the first place. In reply, I expected a litany of books read, lectures attended and intellectual 
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interests developed. And, usually, WKDW¶VZKDW,JRW%XWsometimes, too, I got stories that were 
very different. These were stories whose major themes were not guiding theories, or powerful 
explanatory paradigms ± but that were actually centred on the quality of the feelings experienced 
by the individual scientist in the course of her research. They were stories about feelings of upset, 
sadness and fear, but also stories of pride, desire, and even love.    
In her account of the emergence of the autism spectrum, and of the waxing 
understandings that have appended it, Chloe Silverman urges attention to the use of love, 
VSHFLILFDOO\DVDQµDQDO\WLFDOWRRO¶ ± tDONLQJDERXWORYHVD\V6LOYHUPDQµVKLIWVWKHIRFXV
from psychiatrists, epidemiologists, and geneticists to parents, counsellors, diagnosticians, 
DQGODZ\HUV¶,IIRUSV\FKRORJLVWVORYHKDVVLPSO\EHHQVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKH\
studied in autism:  
EH\RQGWKHODERUDWRULHV«ORYHFRQWLQXHVWRIXQFWLRQLQQRUPDWLYHFODLPVDERXWWKHSUDFWLFHRI
research. Parents and their allies say that emotional knowledge enables them to observe and 
attend to their children in the right way, guides them in medical decisions, and helps them make 
the right choices for the person they love (ibid.). 
IIORYHKDVVRPHWLPHVEHHQVHHQµDVDOLDELOLW\RUDEDUULHUWRUHOLDEOHNQRZOHGJH¶WKHUHLV
URRPQRZWRVWDUWWKLQNLQJDERXWORYHDVµWKHVRXUFHRIVSHFLILFIRFXVHGDQGFRPPitted 
NQRZOHGJH¶LELGSS-4). In this paper, I want to advance that suggestion in two ways. 
)LUVW,ZDQWWREXLOGRQ6LOYHUPDQ¶VDFFRXQWRIORYHWRWKLQNDERXWWKHEURDGHUUROHRI
emotion and affect in the putting-together of concrete knowledge. Second, I want to suggest 
that paying attention to emotions, and to the role that emotions play in generating and 
sustaining knowledge of something like autism, does not necessarily move us beyond the 
laboratory. My key argument is that focusing on the role of emotions in making 
knowledgeable claims tells us something important about the practice of neuroscience. Here, 
and among autism researchers especially, I argue that an unimpeachably scientific, 
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laboratory-based work of looking for, and thinking about, the neurobiology of autism, is 
often an emotional and an affective labour too.  
RHFRJQLWLRQRIHPRWLRQ¶VSUHVHQFHLQVFLHQWLILFVSDFHVKDVDORQJKLVWRU\LQscience 
and technology studies (Lynch, 1985: 169; Latour, 1996: 282). But if the place of affect in 
the laboratory is no surprise, there remains a question ± most famously posed by Max Weber 
(1919) ± of the relationship between the passionate attachment that motivates a scientific 
interest, the actual performance of scientific work, and the status of the objects and truth-
claims that are produced. Recently, and drawing in particular on long-standing attentions to 
the body and affect within feminist science studies (Haraway, 1988; Hayles, 1999), scholars 
have started to more precisely characterise the  circular and generative nature of this 
relationship. Elizabeth Wilson, LQKHUZRUNRQ7XULQJ¶VFDOFXODWLQJPDFKLQHKDVurged 
DWWHQWLRQWRWKHZD\WKDWµIHHOLQJDQGWKLQNLQJPLJKWFRDVVHPEOH¶LQWKHXQIROGLQJRID
modern technoscience (2010: 24). Natasha Myers, focusing on the relationship between 
dance, body-movement and molecular biology, has shown some of the ways that scientists 
XVHWKHLUERGLHVWRµILJXUHRXW¶WKHVXEMHFWVRIWKHLUUHVHDUFK± dancing and body-work, she 
DUJXHVFDQEHFRPHµHIIHFWLYHPHGLDIRr articulating the forms, forces and energetics of 
PROHFXODUZRUOGV¶-156). 
In the paper that follows, I ally myself with these accounts of the role of emotional 
labour in autism neuroscience. The paper shows how a firmly neurobiological account of 
DXWLVPPLJKWEHWUDFHGWKURXJKQRWRQO\VFLHQWLVWV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIEHLQJµLQWHUHVWHG¶LQ
autism µLQWHOOHFWXDOO\¶EXWDOVRRIEHLQJµKLW¶E\DXWLVPµLQWKHVWRPDFK¶ But I also ground 
this material in a precise account of the relationship between the emotional qualities of 
scientific subjectivity, and the constitution of scientific objects. To do this, I will draw on the 
process philosophy of AN Whitehead (1935, 1964, 1979). Well-known in contemporary 
social-VFLHQFHWKHRUL]LQJDVDSKLORVRSKHURIµREMHFWV¶UHFHQWO\VFKRODUVKDYHGHHSHQHGWKH
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interest in Whitehead to account for his contributions to subjectivity (Stenner 2008) and the 
emotions (Shaviro 2009) more fully. I work my own data through an engagement with 
Whitehead, here, because Whitehead locates his ontological fore-fronting of experience, and 
of subject-object relations, within specifically emotional moments.  Drawing on Whitehead 
moves us beyond the mere presence of affect, to think about how attending to emotion is 
also a way of thinking about the generative emotion-work of the laboratory. It urges us to 
resist a distinction between the affective qualities of scientific subjectivity, and the hard 
work of achieving a neurobiological correlate of the autism spectrum.   
 
Then it hit me in the stomach 
Consider this extract, which comes from an interview with a senior professor of cognitive 
neuropsychiatry. In the course of our conversation, she began to tell me about her first real 
research job in the field. µ,ZDVWUDYHOOLQJDURXQG[schools] on P\RZQ¶VKHEHJDQ 
and I remember the first time I walked into an autism school ± which I think was [a well-known 
school], one of the first autism schools there was. This of course was in the late eighties. 
And...it's hard to convey because actually autism schools aren't like that anymore. But...the 
sound when you go through the door ± the kind of particular sounds that low-functioning 
children with autism make in place of language that aren't like the squeals of ordinary kids. To 
just walk into the playground and see all the children busy, all this movement but none of it co-
ordinated, children not moving together - you know, one child in a corner rocking, one child 
examining the light through their fingers, another child running in circles, with this extraordinary 
squeal that other children can't produce. It's just so different. You walk through a door, and on 
the other side of the door is a world that's so utterly different from the high street in [that part of 
London]. So I found it completely captivating, and...terribly, terribly upsetting. 
µThat break between the ordinary world and the world of the school¶,DVNHGµFDQ\RX
UHPHPEHU«on what level did it hit you? Was it kind of an emotionalNLQGRI"¶ 
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It's very visceral, yeah. Very visceral. And although I thought I knew a lot about autism, because 
I'd read a lot about autism, I'd heard a lot about autism ± actually I was utterly unprepared for it. 
Nothing I'd read conveyed the level of lack of language, intelleFWXDOLPSDLUPHQW«So, here was 
this thing that I was really passionate about and interested in intellectually. And then it hit me in 
the stomach. It was visceral. It was very visceral. 
There is something striking about this as a description of entering the field and actually doing 
science. Certainly, the Mertonian account (1979) of scientific disinterest and reason is no longer 
influential ± but the construction of this narrative through images of µXSVHW¶µYLVFHUD¶µSDVVLRQ¶
HYHQEHLQJµKLW«LQWKHVWRPDFK¶ still brings me up short. Because however much the passions 
have been a focus in the sociology and history of science, themes of impersonality, disinterest, and 
moral neutrality still structure many accounts of the scientific life ± even if these tropes are only 
maintained for public consumption. Experimental psychology in particular, as Theodore Porter has 
pointed out, following Mitchell Ash, 
µKDVEHHQPRUHVHOI-consciously scientific than the natural sciences precisely because of its 
institutional weakness and intellectual disunity. Inflexible methods of quantification 
FRPSHQVDWHGIRUWKHODFNRIDVHFXUHFRPPXQLW\«>VWDWLVWLFDOWHVWV@ZHUHSDUWRIDUHJLPHRI
replication and impersonality, necessary if the study of psychical phenomena was to win even a 
modest degree of scientific credibilit\¶: 211). 
Indeed a self-conscious psychological scientism was also a theme of my interviews. But these were 
usually overtaken by self-narrations like the following: µ,UHPHPEHURQHZRPDQ¶VDLGa junior 
researcher, 
«it was heart-breaking. Her child was very high-functioning, won awards for this, that, and the 
other. It was her only child ± she said, 'oh, he was my blessing.' She didn't think she'd have 
children - she was, like, forty-plus. But she said 'oh, it's so sad, I'm there with my husband eating 
breakfast and just wish that...Daniel or whatever...would just sit and eat breakfast with us. But 
he's just not interested. He just gets up and walks away.¶ And she was really grieving, because 
this relationship with this blessed child that she'd longed for just hadn't materialised, but he was 
incredibly articulate, incredibly bright, very nice boy - but that kind of emotional, just not 
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engaged, I thought, 'it's so interesting' because she's, you'd think she had the easier deal, but she 
was the one who I think was emotionally finding it a lot harder than some of these other parents 
who you think 'well, I don't know how...your lives are so disrupted,' you know, so that was a 
really interesting lesson. I don't know how it informs my...but I think it does make me sensitive, 
and one thing it does make me think about is that, kind of issues that people will probably say 
are to do with political correctness, I'm very careful about the language I use, like you know, 
'individuals with autism,' and people say 'autistic,' you're just, you know, very careful with the 
language. And being respectful, and things like that. And think, you know, these aren't, you 
know, your subjects - well, they are but, you know, you don't, that's not the way you...relate to 
them. 
Here is the psychologist neither as 0HUWRQ¶V disinterested zealot, nor as 3RUWHU¶V impersonal seeker 
of scientific credibility. Here, instead, is the psychologist as a slightly heart-broken young woman, 
keen to stress KHUVHQVLWLYLW\WRDPRWKHU¶VJULHIfumbling a little with the politics of language, and 
worrying DERXWZKHWKHURUQRWVKHUHODWHVZHOOWRKHUµVXEMHFWV¶± a term that she is reluctant to use. 
Later, distinguishing laboratory life from her home life, she VDLGµ,WKLQN,
PTXLWHDQHPSDWKLF
SHUVRQ«,GRQ
WZDQWWRWDNHWKLVVRUWRIVWXIIKRPHZLWKPH¶As a view of what it is to do science, 
and of what it is to get drawn into the scientific life, I am not only struck by how willing this 
interviewee is to elide any implied injunction towards distance ± but, more specifically, by how 
skilfully she embeds her scientific subjectivity precisely in a deeply personal and emotional 
commitment to other people. In other cases, disinterest was not just elided, but the moral 
imperative of the scientific life was specifically addressed and emotively affirmed. µ,ZDVMRNLQJ
WKHRWKHUGD\ZLWKDIULHQGRIPLQHZKRXVHGWRZRUNLQWKHPRWRUWUDGH¶VDLGRQHbrain-imager: 
We were talking about servicHPDQDJHUV$QG,¶GMXVWPHWVRPHVHUYLFHPDQDJHUVZKRZHUH
friends of friends of ours, at a dinner party ± and I was surprised at the lack of conscience that 
they had. They had no conscience. You know, their family and their friends were very important 
to WKHP%XWHVVHQWLDOO\LILWGLGQ¶WLQIOXHQFHWKHPRUGLGQ¶WKDYHDQLQIOXHQFHRQWKHPGLUHFWO\
they had very little interest in it. And it just seemed to match with the kinds of work that they had 
to do ± you know, they were very keen on meeting businesVWDUJHWVDQGWKDW¶VWKHSULRULW\UDWKHU
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WKDQ«SHRSOH$QGWKHZD\SHRSOHIHHO7KDW¶VVHFRQGDU\WRWKHZD\WKHEXVLQHVVLVUXQ$QG
\RXNQRZWKDW¶VWKHZD\VRPHSHRSOHDUHDQGWKDW¶VILQH%XWVRPHSHRSOHDUHWKHRWKHUZD\
around, and they care perhaps a little bit more about the way people feel. 
2IFRXUVHZKHQKH¶VWDONLQJDERXWWKHµVRPHSHRSOH¶ZKRDUHµWKHRWKHUZD\URXQG¶KHPHDQV
himself and his colleagues ± bright, highly-educated people, working to alleviate the problems of 
people with neurodevelopmental disorders, and doing so in a fairly unglamorous office, for 
relatively small salaries. I was interested in the way he narrated his relationship to scientific work 
DVDZD\RIDWWHQGLQJWRµWKHZD\SHRSOHIHHO¶7KHUHLVDFOHDUVHQVHKHUHRIWhe affective 
commitment of his science, and also of his self-construal as a researcher precisely through 
registers of feeling and care. He told me later about going with a group of friends to a comedy 
club, and being picked out of the crowd by the comedian; on being asked what he did for a living, 
my interviewee was gratified to be able to give the joke-GHI\LQJUHVSRQVHµcancer research¶ (as a 
young medical imager, he had also done research on cancer). µ,W¶VMXVWDERXWJHWWLQJVRPHVleep at 
QLJKW¶KHVDLG to me, 'VR,VXSSRVHLI,FDQJRWRVOHHSDWQLJKWWKLQNLQJ,¶YHPDGHVRPHVRUWRI
FRQWULEXWLRQ>«@WKHQ,¶PKDSS\¶ 
This idea, of worrying about being happy in scientific work, and of locating that happiness 
in a commitment to care for other people, was echoed by another researcher who told me that she 
haGJRWWHQLQWRDXWLVPµE\FKDQFH¶ having been interested in mathematics and neuropsychology. 
But then she talked about how important it was for her to work directly with parents and teachers 
of children with autism. She described these interactions in such a heartfelt way, that I asked her 
how this squared with her avowed disinterest (following her narrative, of course, I myself had 
unconsciously slipped into an affective mode of interviewing)µ)RUP\VHOISHUVRQDOO\¶VKHVDLG 
if I was doing more of a pure science that wasn't...didn't have an end-point that was kind of 
applicable ± I'd sort of find that quite difficult. I think I need to, um...either be a clinician myself 
[laughs] or do applied research.  
:KHQ,DVNHGKHUZK\VKHFRXOGQ¶WMXVWEHKDSS\SURGXFLQJGDWDVKHVDLG 
 9 
I suppose it's just that satisfaction...that whole knowing that what you're doing has a purpose. 
Um...and that it's not just a job. You're dealing with people's lives and, you know, a report that 
\RXZULWHDERXWDFKLOGGRHVJRRQDQGKDYHDQLPSDFW6RXPLW¶V\HDK>«@:HOOLW
VWKH
fact that, you know, you're listening to parents and hearing their stories and you're, you know, 
hearing their suffering and what they've had to put up with and the fights and battles. And, I 
suppose...the fact that they give a lot to you in taking part in research. So they are, um...it's very 
different from a clinician's role. So they give a lot of time to you. And so I suppose it's just 
wanting to give something back to them. 
She then talked more generally about talks that she gives to parents and clinicians, and how she 
contributes to the field more generally, before laughing self-FRQVFLRXVO\DQGVD\LQJµ,KRSH,KDYH
DSXUSRVHLQOLIH¶What I find striking, in these last two accounts, is the sheer refusal of disinterest, 
DQGWKHVHQVHWKDWVFLHQWLILFZRUNLVSULYLOHJHGLQWKHZD\LWUHODWHVWRRWKHUSHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJVDQG
eVSHFLDOO\RWKHUSHRSOH¶VVXIIHULQJ:KDW,DPWU\LQJWRDFFRXQWIRULQWKLVSDSHULV precisely the 
way that such researchers trace their laboratory labour through these kinds of affective registers. I 
am interested in why it is that DQµLQWHOOHFWXDOLQWHUHVW¶LQWKHQHXURVFLHQFHRIDXWLVPmight run 
alongside a reference to stomachs and feelings, to suffering and heartbreak. 
 
I want to do this. I want to do this. 
In their genealogy of objectivity, Daston and Galison point to the emergence of a new kind of 
scientific subject in the nineteenth-FHQWXU\ZKHUHDVWKHµHQOLJKWHQPHQWVDYDQW¶KDGEHHQDQDFWLYH
and critical sifter/synthesizer of data, the scientific subject of the nineteenth century, by contrast, 
µVWURYHIRU a self-GHQ\LQJSDVVLYLW\¶)DUIURPWKHµRWKHUZRUOG\¶ILJXUHRISUHYLRXV
HUDVWKHJRDOQRZZDVWRµSUDFWLFHVHOI-discipline, self-restraint, self-abnegation, self-annihilation, 
and a multitude of other techniques of self-LPSRVHGVHOIOHVVQHVV¶ (ibid.). Steven Shapin (2010) 
makes a similar argument, identifying a turning point in the last couple of centuries in which the 
passionate individual was slowly effaced by narratives centred on slow, processual, collective 
endeavour ± thus did we move frRPDSDVVLRQDWH%HQMDPLQ)UDQNOLQLQWKHVWRDµVWUHVVRQ
 10 
PXQGDQHPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLVFLSOLQH¶DFHQWXU\ODWHU (2010: 33).This also moved causal accounts of 
scientific labour from a felt individual urge, to something rooted in dispassionate collective 
technique. In our century, says Shapin, this has become DFODLPIRUWKHµPRUDOHTXLYDOHQFH¶RI
scientific practice ± or a drive, particularly in the wake of the technological horrors of the Second 
World War, to stress the moral ordinariness of most scientific labours, and their consequent 
abstraction from the vices, virtues, and feelings of individuals (2010: 47). 
Of course, contemporary scientific practices must be distinguished from the 
establishment of these historical norms. Not least, the dispersed laboratory of a modern 
technoscience is filled with all kinds of bodies that were perhaps not well anticipated by the 
disinterested gentlemen of the eighteenth-century ± including, as Donna Haraway reminds 
us, women, working-class people, people from ethnic minority communities, and other 
LQKDELWDQWVRIµQRQVWDQGDUG¶FRUSRUDOLW\DQGDIIHFW. cf. Rose, 1994). As Shapin 
points out, there is a danger of mistaking a receding public script of scientific propriety for 
the actual emergence and assemblage RIWHFKQRVFLHQWLILFZRUNWKHIDFWLVVD\V6KDSLQµWKH
closer you get to the heart of technoscience, and the closer you get to scenes in which 
technoscientific futures are made, the greater is the acknowledged role of the personal, the 
familiaUDQGHYHQWKHFKDULVPDWLF¶ 
Following this recognition, I am trying to think about the way that a contemporary 
scientific project, even one as drily methodological as the search for a neurobiology of 
autism, is traced through the feelings, and the body, of the unapologetically individual and 
familiar autism neuroscientist. As well as accounts of emotional laboratory work that I 
GHVFULEHGDERYHWKHUROHRIHPRWLRQVDQGWKHERG\ZHUHDOVRHYLGHQWLQLQWHUYLHZHHV¶
recollections of the formation of their scientific subjectivities, and in their affectively-
registered desire for the scientific life. µWhen I ZDVWKLQNLQJDERXWXQLYHUVLW\¶one lecturer 
recalled: 
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,¶GUHDOO\KDGDYHU\- I was intending to do English literature, actually, and then just one day, 
OLWHUDOO\,ZRNHXSDQGWKRXJKWµQR,ZDQWWRFKDQJHWKDWWRSV\FKRORJ\
KDYLQJQRUHDOO\
formal idea about psychology education [...] looking back on it, I still think that that was how it 
was. It was literally a wake up in the morning and say ³,¶PQRWJRLQJWRGR(QJOLVKOLWHUDWXUH,
FDQVWLOOUHDGWKHERRNV,ZDQWWRUHDG,¶PJRLQJWRGRSV\FKRORJ\´ 
Several interviewees located the formation of their desire for science in similarly personal, 
passionate and even embodied moments: one mentioned an early encounter with Clara Claiborne 
3DUN¶V(1967) SLRQHHULQJDXWLVPDXWRELRJUDSK\DVVRPHWKLQJZKLFKµPDGHPHYHU\H[FLWHG¶
$QRWKHUWROGPHWKDWVKHKDGMXVWIHOWµVRPHIRUPRILQWULQVLFGHVLUHWRHQDEOHSHRSOHWR>«@OLYH
their lives in a more comfortable environment.¶$QRWKHUUHFDOOHG how, when still at school, 
I was quite into literature and drama, and quite creative, I suppose ± EXW,FRXOGQ¶WOLNHUHDOO\
figure out ever, how am I going to get a proper job out of this [laughs] and then we were doing 
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde at school, and one of my teachers recommended that I go and read some 
Freud because this ties in, so then I went to the library and I looked up Freud. And I remember ± 
I just specifically remember ± being, like, people research how other people think and feel. And I 
QHYHUNQHZWKLVEHIRUH>«@WKLVZDVDPDVVLYHUHYHODWLRQWRPHDQG,ZDVOLNHµ,ZDQWWRGRWKLV
,ZDQWWRGRWKLV¶ 
0D[:HEHUGHVFULEHVWKLVDVWKHVFLHQWLVW¶VIHHOLQJRIµVWUDQJHLQWR[LFDWLRQ¶± which, 
DORQJZLWKDµSDVVLRQDWHGHYRWLRQ¶:HEHUZDVTXLWHZHOODZDUHRIH[FHSWWKDWhe was keen 
WRVHSDUDWHLQWHUHVWIURPSUDFWLFHLQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHµVFLHQWLILFYRFDWLRQ¶%XWZKDW,DP
trying to show, in this paper, is that interviewees worked across those boundaries in a much 
more complex manner than such a rubric would allow. What I heard from these 
interviewees, over and over again, were accounts of scientific subjectivity, and of scientific 
labour, that bespoke a more entangled relationship between intellectual and affective 
practices. In these interviews, doing the neuroscience of autism is the product of an 
intoxicating revelation. And this revelation is borne out in the emotional and affective 
commitments of a very particular kind of scientific labourer ± here, someone who feels, 
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desires, and imagines; someone who is easily thrilled but also slightly upset; someone 
committed to the easing of RWKHUSHRSOH¶VVXIIHULQJVRPHRQHZKRdesires to be morally 
good, and someone who wants to feel happy about that goodness. 
 
Thinking and feeling 
RecentlyµHPRWLRQ¶DQGµDIIHFW¶KDYHHPHUJHGDVPDMRUSRLQWVRILQTXLU\LQVRFLDO-scientific 
and literary-theorising ± with some even diagnosing DQµDIIHFWLYHWXUQ¶Massumi 2002; 
Clough and Halley 2007. See Papoulias and Callard, 2010, for an alternative diagnosis). My 
goal, though, is not to theorise these terms as such1. Instead, I am interested in the broadly 
affective and embodied ways that some autism neuroscientists talk about scientific work and 
scientific lives. In particular I want to know why a neurobiological account of autism often 
gets traced through the feeling body of the individual scientist. If this paper claims any 
affinities with the broad literature on feeling, it is via the longstanding empirical and 
material-feminist attention to the salience of bodies and things± a corpus which, for some 
time now, has been seeking ways to think and live with the always-hybrid nature of 
corporeal human life (e.g. Haraway 1991, Grosz 1994, Blackman and Venn 2010).  
Within the texts on emotion that are broadly affiliated to this tradition, some have 
recently focused on the roles of bodies and emotions within scientific and technological 
spaces. In her discussion of the life of Alan Turing, for example, Elizabeth Wilson (2010) 
H[SORUHVWKHUROHRIDIIHFWQRWRQO\ZLWKLQ7XULQJ¶VRZQOLIHDQGSUDFWLFHEXWZLWKLQDUWLILFLDO
LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGURERWLFVPRUHJHQHUDOO\$WWKHKHDUWRI:LOVRQ¶Vaccount is the attribution 
of affective registers not only to human scientists, but also to the non-humans in these 
                                                 
1
 Note in particular that I do not carefully parse terms like emotion, affect and feeling in this paper ± and I 
proceed on the basis that  my data is not illuminated by, for instance, the distinction between the cognitive and 
the non-cognitive that often marks a break between these terms in affect theories  (see e.g. Pile, 2009, for a 
discussion). Throughout the paper, I use such descriptive terms as they best fit the empirical material ± and this 
is a material that moves, without obvious care, between registers that are variously embodied, qualified, tacit, 
analytic, and so on.     
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spaces. Machines, robots and programmes are not just figures or elements of emotional 
exchange, but nodes within a more general assembly of relays, both figured and figuring 
within a wider affective entanglement. Wilson stresses the degree to which machines and 
machine-properties are not exemplars, nor are they products of a cold, knowing intelligence: 
machines, as well their creators, are bound up with µDIXVLRQRILQWHOOHFWDQGPXVFOHDQG
EHDXW\DQGQHUYHV¶ (2010: 8). Within the laboratory, Wilson argues that the relationship of 
WKLQNLQJWRIHHOLQJLVRQHRIµLQWURMHFWLRQ¶which significantly re-figures how we can think 
about the interiority of both the rational scientist and the calculating machine, as well as the 
creative and generative back-and-IRUWKEHWZHHQWKHWZRLI7XULQJ¶VZRUNDQGOLIHDUH
animated by ERWKµDIIHFWLYHDQGLQWHOOHFWXDOFRQFHUQV¶WKHQµLWLVKLVHUUDQWFXULRVLW\KLV
capacity for enjoyment and surprise, and his childish engagement with computational 
PDFKLQHU\WKDWXQGHUZULWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI>KLVFDQRQLFDO@SDSHU¶ (ibid.: 35). Wilson 
gives a picture of an affectively-committed scientific and intellectual labour, in which the 
scientist is not simply beset by feelings for her objects, but is instead one node within a 
PXFKEURDGHUFLUFXODWLRQRIµDIIHFWLYHFRPPHUFH¶LELGMoreover, WKHVFLHQWLVW¶V
ability to recognise and negotiate the complexity of this emotional web is intimately tied into 
the success of her scLHQWLILFSUDFWLFH,Q:LOVRQ¶VDFFRXQW7XULQJis a brilliant scientist not 
OHDVWEHFDXVHµWKHWUDIILFEHWZHHQ>KLV@LQWHUQDOVWDWHVDQGWKHLQWHUQDOVWDWHVRIRWKHUVLVDNH\
PHWKRGRORJLFDOFRQFHUQLQKLVZRUN¶-18). 
In a related text, but focusing more on the body than emotions, Natasha Myers has 
GUDZQRQKHUH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKHµ'DQFH\RXU3K'¶SKHQRPHQRQ to show some of the ways 
that scientists use body-movement WRµILJXUHRXW¶WKHVXEMHFWVRIWKHLUUHVHDUFK
Dancing and body-work, 0\HUVDUJXHVFDQEHFRPHµHIIHFWLYHPHGLDIRUDUWLFXODWLQJWKH
IRUPVIRUFHVDQGHQHUJHWLFVRIPROHFXODUZRUOGV¶LELG-156). Myers, like Wilson, 
FDOOVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHµDIIHFWLYHHQWDQJOHPHQWV¶RIVFLHQWLILFUHVHDUFK± the way that the 
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cognitive or intellectual aspects of scientific labour, as well as the objects of that effort, are 
not easily separable from the feelings, and the movements, and the vibrations, of the 
VFLHQWLVWVLQWKHODERUDWRU\8VLQJWKHERG\µFDQJHQHUDWHERWKQHZIRUPVRINQRZLQJ, and 
WKHWKLQJVNQRZQ¶0\HUVSRLQWVRXWLWFDQDOVRµPDNHH[SOLFLWWKHNLQDHVWKHWLFDQGDIIHFWLYH
GLPHQVLRQVRIZKDWDUHQRUPDOO\UHFRJQL]HGDVWKRXJKWH[SHULPHQWV¶LELG: 162, 171). 
Centrally DWVWDNHLQ0\HUV¶VDFFRXQWRIVFLHQWLILFZRUNLVUHVHDUFKHrs capacities µto move 
with and be moved by WKHSKHQRPHQDWKDWWKH\DWWHPSWWRGUDZLQWRYLHZ¶LELG
HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO%RGLHVDUHµexcitable tissues¶Myers argues ± WKH\KDYHµWKHFDSDFLW\
WRFROOHFWXSDQGUHOD\QXDQFHGPROHFXODUDIIHFWV¶LEid., emphasis also in original). One of 
WKHSULPDU\PHWDSKRUVWKDW0\HUVGUDZVRQLQKHUDFFRXQWRIVFLHQWLVWV¶ERG\-work is 
µUHQGHULQJ¶± a term whose multiple valences carry the sense of a representation, of the work 
of producing that representation, of a cut, and also of a communication. Dancing your PhD, 
like feeling your robot ± and also, I am trying to show, like figuring out a neurobiological 
account of autism ± is an act of rendering. It articulates the tangle between the body of the 
researcher and the thing researched, but it does so precisely in the service of animating and 
collaborating with (even dancing with) the object in question.  
With Myers and Wilson, then, we can begin to see the productive and even 
generative roles of affHFWLQVFLHQWLILFZRUN,Q:LOVRQ¶VDFFRXQWTXRWLQJ)RUWXQ
µFRJQLWLRQDQGDIIHFW³IHHGRIIHDFKRWKHU«DQGVHWSRVVLELOLWLHVLQPRWLRQ´¶)RU
0\HUVµVFLHQWLVWV«FRQGXFWbody experiments to work through hypotheses about how 
PROHFXOHVLQWHUDFW¶(2012: 156). In both cases, high-quality intellectual work is deeply 
embedded in the ability of scientists to give themselves up to a kind of affective 
relationality; the capacity for thought, here, is thickly entangled with the aptitude for feeling. 
This is precisely what I think is in play among the autism neuroscientists within my 
interviewsDIIHFWPDNHVWKHµFRQVWULFWHGVSDFH¶RIERWKEUDLQDQGGLDJQRVLVPRUHH[SDQVLYH
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:LOVRQLWKHOSVWRµUHQGHU¶QHZSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ the two 
(Myers, 2012: 172). WLWKLQDµFRJQLWLYH¶WDVNWKDWLVDVGLIILFXOW and awkward as finding 
neurobiological correlates for autism, the connective, expansive, and generative possibilities 
of affective relations begin to appear in a new light.   
 Let me return to the senior scientist I quoted at the beginning of this paper. Having told the 
story of her entry to an autism school, she spoke about one of the children in particular:  
So there was a boy in the class I was helping with, who didn't speak at all ± very beautiful-
looking (it's a cliché, but it's true - a lot of children with autism are); always had his hood up 
against sound; easily distressed; and spent a lot of time drawing in the air with his finger. And, 
just occasionally, if you sang to him, he would finish off what you were singing - with words, 
with sung words. But never ever spoke any words (of speech or communication). Just think: if 
you're interested in this, I mean, how fascinating. How completely fascinating.  And how 
completely tragic. I remember, from my undergraduate experience, walking back out of the door 
and into [the] high street. And on one occasion seeing some mum, not exactly slapping their kid, 
but pulling their kid along and giving them a hard time about whatever it was ± whining about 
something or other. And thinking that...it was so extraordinary that that ordinary child could 
communicate - you know, that this two- or three-year old could whine to their mum about this, 
compared to these kids inside this school who, if they'd been able to do anything like whining, 
we'd all have been cheering and clapping. So, I don't know, it's hard to describe. Of course it's a 
very long time ago now. But I remember it clearly. I remember it very clearly. And it was partly 
probably intensified by the fact that I was travelling to these places on my own, and so I would 
go into a centre for a couple of days, and go to a different place for a couple of days. The staff 
and children were very helpful and very likeable. It was still a very kind of, umm, a very 
upsetting experience. 
Looking again at these two extracts, it is striking how central the body is to the narrative ± the 
story is carried along by the squeals and cries of one child, the rocking back and forth of another, 
the light filtered through the fingers of a third, and, finally, the unqualifiable feeling in the 
VWRPDFKRIWKHUHVHDUFKHUKHUVHOI,W¶VDOVRQRWHZRUWK\WKDWWKHLQWHUYLHZHHLQWHUSUHWVP\
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question about emotions as a question about the body ± and she affirms the specifically affective 
QDWXUHRIKHUH[SHULHQFHRQWKDWOHYHOµLW¶VYHU\YLVFHUDO\HDK¶In the second story, the body is 
also very much to the forefront ± here, the account is built on a foundation of singing voices and 
splayed fingers, of slapping hands and beautiful faces. 
But I particularly want to draw attention to the triumvirate that appears at the end of her 
first story ± ZKHUHDXWLVPLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKHUHVHDUFKHULVµSDVVLRQDWHDERXW¶WKDWVKHLV
µLQWHUHVWHGLQ¶EXWWKDWILQDOO\µKLWV¶KHUµLQthe VWRPDFK¶There is a sense that, once this 
researcher goes out into the tangible world of special schools and disordered children, her 
intellectual interest in autism enters into exchange with, and becomes thinkable through, affects, 
emotions and bodies. Wilson (2004: 41) has argued elsewhere that the gut, specifically, is the 
ERXQGDU\WKDWµDOORZVWKHRXWVLGHZRUOGWRSDVVULJKWWKURXJKXV¶6KHTXRWHV*HUVKRQ
WRWKHHIIHFWWKDWµWKHRSHQWXEHWKDWEHJLQVDWWKHPRXWKHQGVDWWKHDQXV3DUDGR[LFal as it may 
VHHPWKHJXWLVDWXQQHOWKDWSHUPLWVWKHH[WHULRUWRUXQULJKWWKURXJKXV¶LELG,FDQQRWKHOS
now, but think about this LQWHUYLHZHH¶Vstory as a memory of a similarly complex form of 
embodied experience and understanding ± where her intellectual interest in autism is at least 
part-transacted through some more stomached feeling. Equally, in the second account, discussion 
of the science does not go unaccompanied by an acknowledgement of a very visceral sadness ± 
and vice versaµ+RZFRPSOHWHO\IDVFLQDWLQJ¶VKHVD\VRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGµKRZFRPSOHWHO\
WUDJLF¶RQWKHRWKHU 
My argument is that the tangle of these two experiences ± distress and fascination; upset 
and interest ± in the midst of such a heavily embodied account, shows what is sometimes tacitly 
at stake in the conduct of an autism neuroscience, viz. the use of the body, and of emotion, to 
sustain, generate, and animate an intellectual concern with the brain-basis of complex problems 
in neurodevelopment. I am drawing particular attention to the delicate way in which, between the 
ILUVWVWRU\DQGWKHVHFRQGWKLVUHVHDUFKHU¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOFRQFHUQVKDYHDFTXLUHGVRPHLGHQWLILDEO\
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affective commitments. More importantly, I am making a claim for the synchronicity of this 
UHVHDUFKHU¶VFDSDFLW\WRthink autism, and her willingness to feel it. My suggestion is that it is 
precisely her ability to trace her science through these two experiences, to memorialise them and 
articulate them together, that enables her to continue to push through the very complex work of 
autism neuroscience.  
 
Objects of Feeling 
At stake, here, is some identifiable relationship between an affective scientific practice and the 
object to which that practice ultimately addresses itself, viz. in this case, the neurobiology of 
autism. We already have an idea, drawing on Wilson (2004, 2010), and on Myers (2012), that 
there is some generative alliance between the feeling and the embodiment of scientists, on the one 
hand, and the ability of those scientists to articulate a complex scientific problem, on the other. In 
what remains of this paper, I want to build on these suggestions. In particular, I want to move 
WRZDUGVWKLQNLQJDFRQVWLWXWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHVHVFLHQWLVWV¶HPRWLRQVWKe 
affective nature of their scientific work, and the possibility of a neurobiological account of autism. 
I am particularly keen to make this move because the recollections and feelings that I have 
recounted clearly have some quite specific end in mind. I already quoted one interviewee saying, 
µKHUHZDVWKLVWKLQJWKDW,ZDVUHDOO\SDVVLRQDWHDERXW¶DQGDQRWKHUVD\LQJµLI,ZDVGRLQJPRUHRI
a pure science that wasn't...didn't have an end-point that was kind of applicable ± I'd sort of find 
that quite diffiFXOW¶%HORZZH¶OOILQGDQRWKHULQWHUYLHZHHZKRLQWKHPLGVWRIDEODWDQWO\
HPRWLRQDODFFRXQWVD\VDOPRVWDVDQDVLGHµ,ZDQWWRNQRZ«ZKDWLWLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\¶7KH
relationship bHWZHHQDIIHFWDQGWKLVµWKLQJ¶± WKLVµLW¶ ± is what I wish to turn to now.  
In fact, there is already a well-known discussion of the role played by emotion in the 
coming-WRJHWKHURIWKLQJVDQGWKLVLV:KLWHKHDG¶VµSURFHVVSKLORVRSK\¶
:KLWHKHDG¶VFRPSOH[V\VWHPLVGLIILFXOWWRVHWRXWLQa confined space. But his account is 
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essentially FHQWUHGRQZKDWKHFDOOVµSUHKHQVLRQV¶ ± moments of substantive 
attraction (or, in its negative form, repulsion) between one entity and another (1979: 19). For 
Whitehead, such substantive connections between entities are essentially constitutive of all 
objects, and of all elements of all objects, in this universe. But when Whitehead talks about 
WKHFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQµHQWLWLHV¶KHLVLQFOXGLQJIRUH[DPSOHERWKDSHUVRQUHJDUGLQJD
chair, and also, within the timber frame of the chair, the regard that the various chemical 
components of the wood have for one another. A prehension LVWKXVµDQ\JUDVSLQJRUVHQVLQJ
of one entity by another, or response of one entity to another: whether this takes the form of 
a stone faOOLQJWRHDUWKRUP\ORRNLQJDWDQREMHFWLQIURQWRIPH¶6KDYLURIn its 
positive form, this grasping is described by Whitehead as a feeling ± and it is particularly 
µIHHOLQJ¶:KLWHKHDGJRHVRQWRVXJJHVWWKDWGHVFULEHVµWKHEDVLFJHQHULFRSHUDWLRQRI
SDVVLQJIURPWKHREMHFWLYLW\RIWKHGDWDWRWKHVXEMHFWLYLW\RIWKHDFWXDOHQWLW\LQTXHVWLRQ¶
(1979: 49). Thus, the moment of substantive and positive connection ± which, for 
Whitehead, in its on-going, processual character, is basically constitutive of all things ± is a 
specifically emotional and affective moment, and always an instance of feeling. Whitehead 
describes the quality RIWKHVHLQWHUDFWLRQVLQWHUPVRIµWKHaffective tone determining the 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKDWSUHKHQVLRQLQWKDWRFFDVLRQRIH[SHULHQFH¶P\HPSKDVLV
$QGWKXVDQ\µRFFDVLRQ¶IRU:KLWHKHDGµHQMR\VLWVGHFLVLYHPRPHQWRIDEVROXWHVHOI-
attainment DVHPRWLRQDOXQLW\«the creativity of the world is the throbbing emotion of the 
SDVWKXUOLQJLWVHOILQWRDQHZWUDQVFHQGHQWDOIDFW¶ (ibid., my emphasis). If experience is the 
pre-HPLQHQWRQWRORJLFDOIDFWWKHQµWKHEDVLVRIH[SHULHQFHLVHPRWLRQDO¶LELG 226). 
What Whitehead attempts to breach, with this claim, is the fundamental division 
between subjects and objects that has bedevilled our capacity to talk meaningfully about the 
concrescence of objects for some time now. This is his famous objecWLRQWRWKHµELIXUFDWLRQ
RIQDWXUH¶LQZKLFKDFFRUGLQJWR:KLWHKHDGDULJLGVHSDUDWLRQZDVHQDFWHGEHWZHHQWKH
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redness or the warmth of the sun, and its chemical or molecular structure. Against the claim 
that one of these is proper to the sun, and one proper to the subjects, minds or bodies 
experiencing it ± for Whitehead, what the sun is is the series of positive and negative 
prehensions between things that have the positions of subjects and objects at any given 
moment (and here he draws no distinction between electrons, particle waves, neurons, 
people, warmth, and so on) (1964: 30; 1979: 41). And these positive-assembling relays are 
emotional in character; they have the quality of feeling. Such acts of perception and 
prehension:KLWHKHDGDUJXHVFDQµEHFRQFHLYHGDVWKHWUDQVIHUHQFHRIWKUREVRIHPRWLRQDO
HQHUJ\¶:KDWZHEHJLQWRVHHZLWK:KLWHKHDGWKHQLVDGLVUXSWLRQRIWKH
ERXQGDU\EHWZHHQWKHIHHOLQJRIVRPHWKLQJDQGWKDWWKLQJ¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ$V6WHQJHUVSRints 
out, feeling begins WRKDYHWKHSRZHURIDYHFWRUµWKHSRLQW¶VD\V6WHQJHUVµLVWKXVWRWDNH
literally the common-VHQVHVWDWHPHQW³WKLVWKLQJLVSUHVHQWLQP\H[SHULHQFHLQVRIDUDVLWLV
HOVHZKHUH´DQGWRFRQVWUXFWLWVFRQFHSW¶7RWKLnk with Whitehead, as Stengers 
HYRFDWLYHO\SXWVLWLVWREHJLQµWUDQVIRUPLQJVFDUVLQWRGDWD¶ 
Here, we begin to approach a more precise account of the relationship between my 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶HPRWLRQDOVWRULHVRIDXWLVPUHVHDUFKDQGWKHLUGHVLUe to nonetheless 
scientifically comprehend the neurobiological basis of autism. In the Whiteheadian scheme, 
insofar as an actual neurobiology of autism might come into existence, it is as a product of 
the very concrete emotional apprehensions of one another by its various elements ± neurons, 
electrons, cognitive theories, scientific bureaucracies, over-interested local authorities, and, 
not least, individual scientists themselves. And so it becomes thinkable that scientists 
working at the very coalface of neurobiological autism research, straining to understand this 
relationship, and struggling to bring it into view, would talk about their practice in a deeply 
affective register. In talking through their attempt to apprehend the delicate connection 
between neuroscience and autism, and in reflecting on the fragility, still, of their 
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understanding, might we not actually expect WKHPWRVD\WKLQJVOLNHµLWZDVKHDUW-EUHDNLQJ¶
RUµ,IRXQGLWFRPSOHWHO\FDSWLYDWLQJDQGWHUULEO\WHUULEO\XSVHWWLQJ¶RUµLW
VQRt just a job: 
\RX
UHGHDOLQJZLWKSHRSOH
VOLYHV¶RUµ,love the kids and I love WKHIDPLOLHV¶RUµLWPDGHPH
YHU\H[FLWHG¶RUµ,ZDQWWRGRWKLV,ZDQWWRGRWKLV¶:RXOGZHQRWSUHGLFWRIDQDXWLVP
scientist, a heavy investment in feeling, and a tacit commitment to strikingly emotional 
discourse? Would we not anticipate, in her talk, precisely the kinds of descriptions that we 
have gathered here?  
I am working hard to not over-interpret this: there is no comparator here, and I make no 
general claim about the specificity of emotional discourse to autism neuroscientists. Nor do I 
argue that good autism neuroscience has to be a deeply emotional experience. But I mark a 
reluctance, all the same, to see only coincidence between the delicate and complex process of 
autism neuroscience, its awkward relationship to the separation of subjective experience from 
objective comprehension, and the strikingly emotional and affective way in which many of these 
scientists talk about their work. It seems to me that a scientific practice so actively working 
towards its object, so strongly marked by deeply-felt emotional attachments, and yet so intensely 
alive to the potent nature of affective relationality ± it seems to me that such a practice may yet 
open up the space in which to risk some other analysis. Let me develop this last point by moving 
onto my final example ± in which both feelings about, and the constitution of, the brain-basis of 
autism are very much in question. It loops back to where we began this account: with feelings of 
love. 
 
Circuits of love 

,WZDVIURPDWKHRUHWLFDOVWDQFHUHDOO\WKDW,ZDVLQWHUHVWHGLQDXWLVP¶EHJDQD\RXQJUHVHDUFKHU 
But then I started working with two children with autism - one who was four, and one who was five. 
And both had very little speech. And I did applied behavioural analysis with those kids. I did therapy 
once a week for, like, I think four or five years [...] so I was quite involved with the families and the 
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kids, and their schooling. And I saw huge improvements, in kids who didn't speak at four to five, and 
GLGQ¶WUHDOO\FRPPXQLFDWHYHU\ZHOODWDOOWRWKHQEHLQJHLJKWRUQLQHDQG>ZKRWKHQ@FRXOGFRQYHUVH- 
not in a grammatically correct way necessarily, but [they] could make themselves understood. And also 
there were stark differences in these kids, which is quite, I think, characteristic of autism in general - 
just the variability, in that one child in particular, was so...he was just...he just wanted... [here she 
struggled audibly] he wanted to sp... ... [very quickly] he wanted to have friends. He wanted to interact 
with other kids. He just didn't know how to. 
Already, here, there is a juxtaposition between the prosaic scientific account, and something more 
self-consciously emotionally-committed: in the space of just a few sentences, we are discussing 
WKHLQWHUYLHZHH¶V µWKHRUHWLFDOVWDQFH¶RQDXWLVP¶as well as an unambiguously poignant image of 
the child who struggles to make friends. This researcher does not name her upset± but I remember 
this interview being a small bit uncomfortable. As I have tried to render in the extract, there are a 
lot of gaps and silences on the tape, especially in places where you probably would name the 
emotion in question, and there are even a couple of places where this accomplished young scientist 
LVDOPRVWWDONLQJTXLHWO\WRKHUVHOIµ:DV>WKLVFKLOG@NLQGRIDUWLFXODWLQJDGHVLUHIRUIULHQGVKLS"¶,
asked. 
Yeah, yeah, oh, yeah-yeah-yeah. Whereas the other child wasn't particularly interested in other kids. 
And his language didn't take, interestingly, as much as the other child's did. Because he just didn't 
interact with those other kids. They were both in mainstream schools. Um...but anyway that really 
got...I wanted to know why...I wanted to know why there was such variability in the autism spectrum, 
um, in terms of their outcomes. And...what we could do about it, I guess; what kind of factors might 
actually determine their outcomes. So might it be intrinsic child-related factors, like level of language to 
start off with, or IQ, or personality, temperament, or...general personality ± or whether there were more 
kind of environmental or extrinsic factors, like how much interventLRQWKH\¶YHKDGRUWKHW\SHRI
schooling they've got, or the type of family structure they've got. So I kind of got interested in that, and 
what we could do about it. I guess what we can do to try and...ensure that children with autism reach 
their potential, basically.  
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µ<HDK¶,VDLGµEHFDXVHWKDW
VDELWKHDUW-breaking ± the kid who wants to have friends but doesn't 
NQRZKRZ¶ 
Oh, I know. I mean that's what it was - I mean, the school he was in was lovely. So, that's just luck in 
some respects ± he could not have been in a school that was lovely. And of course this was in primary 
school. When you get into secondary school, it's much more...it's hard for everybody, not necessarily 
just people with autism, but everyone.  
She then steered away again from these kinds of topics and spoke again in that more obviously 
µVFLHQWLILF¶YHLQDERXWGLIIHUHQFHVLQ autism. µ7KRVHDUHVXFKGLIIHUHQWWKLQJVWRDUWLFXODWH¶,VDLG
trying to point to the relationship between her affective and scientific commitments, µ>«@ I guess I'm 
wondering how did you transition from one to the other, or how did you negotiate the tension between 
those two  [kinds of commitment]"¶µ,QVRPHUHVSHFWVWKHUHZDVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\DWHQVLRQ¶VKH
replied. 
My research was on theory of mind - but also on other cognitive skills of kids with autism. And what I 
realised from my observations of working with the kids but also during my research and the results of 
my research, was that these kids did have problems in theory of mind, which limits the sorts of 
interactions they can have and understand. But they also have additional weaknesses and strengths as 
well. And that also places them with advantage, but also disadvantages as well. And so that was the 
tension, I think >«@ 
I heard this as an unwillingness to acknowledge the polarities in her account, when it was obvious 
to me that the autism she was working with was involved in a much more complex system of 
apprehension and exchange ± one that lacked an REYLRXVµELIXUFDWLRQ¶EHWZHHQFRJQLWLYHWKeories, 
neurodevelopmental disorders, anxious children, and curious, empathic researchers. What I did not 
hear at the time, however, but which strikes me now, is her focus on the specificity of autism 
itself, not as an evasion, but in fact as an elaboration of this theme. As she says: relations between 
GLIIHUHQWZD\VRIFRQVWUXFWLQJDXWLVPµthat ZDVWKHWHQVLRQ¶6KHLVYHU\FOHDU± although I am 
deaf to it in the exchange ± that she is not emoting IRULWVRZQVDNHEXWWRµNQRZZK\¶,QRWKHU
words, she is trying to talk about autism concretely, but not at all as a way to get around emotion, 
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or to ignore it. In fact, in the Whiteheadian sense, being able to talk about autism might be the 
whole purpose of this sense of affective relationality in the first place. Thinking we had 
nonetheless gone off-topic, I re-phrased the question, and asked if a therapeutic desire had always 
driven her. 
>«@I guess...yeah...[long pause]. I guess I want...[another longish pause], I'm quite, um...[almost talking 
to herself] it's not empathy...I guess empathy, with...I really get on with my families, so I've just written 
120 Christmas cards to my...all my kids [she ODXJKVXSURDULRXVO\RQµNLGV¶], all my autistic kids in [my 
home city] and here ± just, you know, I do this every year. So, I get on really well...I love....[she catches 
herself here, but then repeats quite definitively] I love the kids and I love the families, and I think I feel 
that kind of rapport with them, so there's the sense that I kind of want them to do...I want them to do as 
best as they possibly can ± because I can see that they have potential, and so, I think that's what drives a 
lot of my work.  
I remember being taken aback at the emergence of love here ± and I think she was too, 
given how much of an effort it was to even articulate its presence. In some prosaic ways, 
feelings of love should not be surprising: my interviewees, often (but not always) relatively 
young women, and often at quite an early stage in their careers, could not afford to be 
innocent of the intellectual and pragmatic complexity of familial love (Donald, 2012). This 
is not incidental: although there is not space, here, to engage the broader scholarship on the 
ILJXULQJRIZRPHQ¶VVFLHQWLILFODERXU)R[.HOOHU; H. Rose, 1994; Donald, 2012), or 
to do justice to the complicated and mostly US-based statistics on the place of women in 
psychology and neuroscience (Nature Neuroscience, 2006) ± still my analysis takes 
seriously +LODU\5RVH¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWµIHPLQLVWELRORJLVWVin contesting the boundaries 
of nature and culture laid down by sociobiology, understood in a direct and practical way 
WKDWDVZRPHQZHRXUERGLHVDQGRXUVHOYHVDUHSDUWRIERWKQDWXUHDQGRIFXOWXUH¶
2).  This, indeed, is the sense in which I want to focus on the emergence of love, here. Just 
as it was in the previous account, the rhetorical move is open circulatory, and once more 
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the narrative moves from theoretical stances to the emotion and back out again. µAt the 
VDPHWLPH¶VDLG my interviewee, 
I want to know why - what it is, fundamentally, about kids with autism that is different to typical 
kids, so how do they perceive the world, and view the world that might be different to us...and 
how...and what we might do to ameliorate any differences.  
I said earlier that accounts of autism neuroscience are often shot-through with thick reports 
of sadness, upset, love, anxiety and even pride. I said that scientists who are 
methodologically open to affect are not just emotional for its own sake, but that, in fact, their 
capacity for feeling, and for emotional labour, is heavily implicated in their attempt to work 
across an un-bifurcated nature. This move is again remarkably explicit here: we see that the 
actual practice of autism research is heavily invested in the simultaneous passing-by of 
WKLQNLQJDQGIHHOLQJWKDWSDVVLRQDWHDWWDFKPHQWVµ,ORYHWKHNLGV¶DUHQRWVHSDUDWHGIURP
LQWHOOHFWXDOLQWHUHVWVµWKDW¶VZKDWGULYHVDORWRIP\ZRUN¶%XWcriticallyWKLVUHVHDUFKHU¶V
basic concern, and she is very keen to stress thisLVWKHµZK\¶± what, exactly, is this thing 
underlying all these problems? I am now disinclined to think about this as I did at the time, 
which was to assume that my interviewee focuseGRQWKHµZK\¶LQRUGHUWRDYRLGtalking 
about DQHPEDUUDVVLQJVXUIHLWRIDIIHFWLHWKDWVKHµORYH>V@WKHNLGV«DQGWKHIDPLOLHV¶In 
fact, the argument that I have been building throughout this paper LVWKDWWKHµZK\¶RIDXWLVP
might be precisely what this whole system of affective labour is directed at in the first place. 
I am coming to the conclusion, in other words, that the specific, dry, and technical issues 
about the objective make-up of autism, which skate endlessly across the top of these 
accounts, and which are insisted-upon particularly in this final contribution, are not simply a 
way to avoid talking about love.  They are there, in fact, precisely to explain it. An affective 
labour is thus not something external to the doing of neuroscience, nor to its objects. IIt is, 
instead, one of the ways in which precisely those works, and those objects, may be made, 
and sustained, and strengthened, and understood.  
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Conclusion 
The role of emotional labour has a well-established place within the critical-psychological 
and psychosocial literatures (Cromby, 2007; Greco and Stenner [eds.], 2008), including in 
related accounts of autism (Hobson, 1995). But it is still not widely acknowledged within the 
self-conVFLRXVO\µKDUGHU¶VSDFHVRIFRJQLWLYHQHXURSV\FKRORJ\DQGELRORJLFDOSV\FKLDWU\. 
Both of these are often publicly invested (and, in the contemporary academy, probably with 
good reason) in un-problematized discourses of quantification, distance, method, simple 
REMHFWLYLW\DQGVRRQ,WLVQRWDWDOOP\SXUSRVHWRWU\DQGUHPRYHWKHµYHLO¶RIWKHVHORJLFV
or WRDUJXHWKDWWKH\DUHµUHDOO\¶VWLOOYHU\REYLRXVO\HPRWLRQDORUsubjective, despite claims 
to the contrary. My purpose, instead, has been to describe the quiet, and complex, but still 
generative alliance between such logics of distance and impersonality, and, nonetheless, the 
very obvious on-going presence of feeling and emotion in these spaces. I have tried to show 
that figuring the neurobiology of autism across categories of both thinking and feeling, of 
WU\LQJWRXQGHUVWDQGLWµRXWWKHUH¶E\IHHOLQJLWµLQKHUH¶VKRZVQRWRQO\WKHSRURXVQHVVRI
the boundary between quantificatory logics of distance and the affective labour of laboratory 
practice; it also shows how the two might be traced together in attempts to understand the 
brain-basis of just such a tricky and ill-defined diagnostic entity as the autism spectrum.  
On this basis, I want to conclude with a normative suggestion, which is that reseaUFKHUV¶
experiences of flows of love, desire, fear, sadness, and so on, can be a good thing in 
neuroscientific research. The relationship between affect and concrete knowledge might create 
space, then, for researchers to talk more frankly, and more positively, about the roles of emotions 
and feelings ± of stomachs and loves ± within the rubric of the new brain sciences. In fact, my 
interviewees talked quite openly about their affective commitments. And yet, although the 
function of these commitments seemed undeniable, no-one really talked about the positive place of 
 26 
feeling in her neurobiological or cognitive-psychological research practice. Indeed, there was a 
tendency for interviewees to step away from these accounts, and to circle back to a distanced 
discRXUVHRIµXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶But could there not be space to talk more explicitly, and to think 
more positively, about the concrete roles of emotion and feeling in bringing the objects of a 
scientific neuropsychology into view? And might we not then imagine neuroscientific and 
laboratory-based spaces that would allow researchers to reflect upon, and even to refine, the 
deeply scientific, but also thickly emotional labour, that I have tried to describe in this paper? 
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